This GCSB presentation dated 21 March 2012 shows that the Waihopai listening station’s main target was a satellite based above the Kiribati islands: see the Sunday Star Times article Snowden files: Inside Waihopai’s domes, 8 March 2015.
These six slides from 2010 GCHQ presentation outline the results of a trial operation to acquire SIM encryption keys: see the Intercept article The Great SIM Heist: How Spies Stole the Keys to the Encryption Castle, 19 February 2015.
This undated presentation from NSA’s Network Analysis Center describes agency techniques for overcoming Virtual Private Networks (VPNs): see the Der Spiegel story Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA’s War on Internet Security, 28 December 2014.
Read to the Internet Ungovernance Forum in Istanbul, 5 September 2014
Thank you for inviting me to speak to you today. I apologize for not being able to speak to you by video conference. Last-minute technical problems have made that method of communication impossible.
I’d like to take this opportunity, before an audience of activists, academics and journalists in Istanbul to discuss the relationship between censorship and surveillance, which are in many ways two sides of the same coin. The Turkish people are subject to both of these technically assisted forms of state manipulation, although the former has received far more attention than the latter.
When governments censor their citizens’ access the Internet, they not only trample on basic human rights, but they also make it much easier for foreign governments to gain access to those domestic communications. For censorship equipment to be able to function, domestic traffic must flow through it. This equipment is a natural target for nation-state intelligence agencies. If they can hack into and compromise the censorship equipment, they get access to all of the communications that flow through it. It only takes one security flaw or an intentionally placed backdoor in a censorship device to transform it from a tool of domestic oppression to a trojan horse for foreign government surveillance.
In the past few years, several governments have started to openly question their reliance on foreign-made communications technology, whether 4G telephone network equipment made by Huawei, or Internet switches made by Cisco. The national security arguments against foreign-made networking technology apply equally to foreign-made censorship technology. When governments install censorship equipment at the core of their national communications networks, how can they be sure that they’re not also inviting in a foreign intelligence service?
In an ideal world, governments would respect the free speech rights of their citizens enough to not filter their Internet communications. Sadly, we do not yet live in that world. Perhaps in time, governments will realize that the serious cybersecurity and foreign-surveillance threats posed by censorship equipment outweigh whatever supposed benefits of national stability and control that they bring.
To all of those present who struggled in Gezi Park, to those who struggle at the Ungovernance Forum today, thank you for your support and your solidarity. You have my support and solidarity.
Selected slides, some with speaking notes, drawn from a 2010 NSA presention, describe the aims of the agency’s operations against Chinese company Huawei: see the New York Times article N.S.A. Breached Chinese Servers Seen as Security Threat, 22 March 2014.
A series of casual posts written by a single author stationed in the NSA’s Signals Intelligence Directorate and posted on the agency’s intranet in 2012. Several posts written in December of that year describe the rationale and methodology of targeting systems administrators: see the Intercept article Inside the NSA’s Secret Efforts to Hunt and Hack System Administrators, 20 March 2014.
This extract from an NSA document dated December 2012 shows the agency’s concern that other nation-state actors are adopting similar techniques: see the Intercept article How the NSA Plans to Infect ‘Millions’ of Computers with Malware, 12 March 2014.
These pages from an NSA internal catalogue describe the tools available to the agency in 2008: see the Der Spiegel article NSA’s Secret Toolbox: Unit Offers Spy Gadgets for Every Need, 30 December 2013