

VISIT PRÉCIS

Hr. Dietmar B [REDACTED]
Director SIGINT Analysis and Production
German Federal Intelligence Service (BND)
30 April – 1 May 2013

SID DIR Courtesy Call: 30 April 2013, 1100 – 1130

Participants: Mr. [REDACTED] SUSLOL Designee; Mr. [REDACTED] D/DA; Mr. [REDACTED] D/A&P; Mr. [REDACTED] Chief SSG; Ms. [REDACTED], SUSLAG Designee; Ms. [REDACTED] CDO Germany

(U) BACKGROUND:

- (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Hr. B [REDACTED] assumed his current position in 2011 and is marking his second visit to NSA. He is rumored to be under consideration to become the next SIGINT Director, succeeding MG Hartmut F [REDACTED]. He will be accompanied by Hr. Wilfried K [REDACTED] Director of SIGINT Collection, and the following BND leadership:

Hr. Andreas H [REDACTED] Director, BND Cyber Defense Center
[REDACTED] Chief, Tasking and Customer Relations
[REDACTED] BND Liaison Officer, Washington, D.C.

(U) PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:

- (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Discussions during the third Strategic Planning Conference (SPC) will focus on topics of mutual interest and future areas of collaboration. With NSA's encouragement, the Germans are coming prepared to define specific capabilities in potential new areas of analytic and Computer Network Defense (CND) collaboration. This SPC will present an opportunity for NSA/CSS leadership to assess the BND's contributions and reiterate their commitment to the German partnership. SID DIR's discussions will set the tone for a productive conference.

(U) VISITOR REQUESTED:

- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, DEU) The BND is eager to present its SIGINT capabilities and gaps on the targets of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] with the goal of expanding the partnership. Their delegation includes several senior analysts, who are prepared to engage NSA leadership in identifying areas of mutual cooperation. The BND also is prepared to discuss progress of the new BND Cyber Defense Center and the policies and authorities governing the mission, while seeking lessons learned from NSA.

(U) NSA/CSS REQUESTED: (TS//SI//NF) Status of BND-NSA bilateral initiatives, highlighting:

- Identify mutual intelligence gaps on [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] target areas

- Enhanced CT analytic and SIGDEV technical cooperation with BND and BfV (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) given the formalization of the NSA-BfV SIGINT partnership in March 2013.
- Discussion of German policies/authorities of the new BND Cyber Defense Center and collaboration with the defensive mission; NTOC will brief TUTELAGE
- Status of [REDACTED] and Special Source access programs
- Germany's support to the [REDACTED] SIGINT Coalition ([REDACTED]) and continued support in [REDACTED] for the SIGINT Counter-IED mission and global IED threat.

(U) CYBERCOM REQUESTED: N/A.

(U) COMMON THREADS: (TS//SI//REL TO USA, DEU)

- NSA welcomes the BND's eagerness to strengthen and expand cooperation with NSA
- Investing in BND's technical expertise to support the BfV and other German services could bolster Germany's effectiveness against terrorism and cyber threats

(U) KEY TOPICS

- (S//REL TO USA, DEU) Thank Hr. B [REDACTED] for the close partnership that NSA enjoys with the BND
- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Enhancing the technical and analytical capabilities of our German intelligence partners will better-equip Germany to counter terrorists; NSA's desire to partner closely with both BND and BfV
- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, DEU) NSA's willingness to explore new areas of cooperation that fill mutual intelligence gaps

(U) KEY TAKEAWAYS:

1. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, DEU) **Expanding the Scope of Bilateral Cooperation:** During recent meetings with BND leadership, DIRNSA, DDIR, and SID encouraged the BND to define specific capabilities on [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] for discussion at the SPC. Thank the BND for coming so well prepared to discuss its potential contribution in these area and to give NSA the opportunity to evaluate where a formal bilateral partnership at the TS//SI level has the most promise.
2. (S//SI//REL TO USA, DEU) **Counterterrorism:** Share that NSA received ODNI approval in March 2013 to *establish a formal CT relationship with the BfV* and anticipates increasing synergy against the target with BND/BfV/NSA collaboration; *NSA also has signed the Terms of Reference to provision XKEYSCORE technology to the BfV.* Thank the BND for its leadership in providing technical solutions/support to the BfV.
3. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, DEU) **Computer Network Defense:** Commend Germany for establishing the BND Cyber Defense Center in Berlin and the National Cyber Defense Centre in Bonn. Encourage BND/ BfV/ BSI (Information Assurance Service) collaboration to leverage SIGINT support to CND. Share that NSA is eager to learn more about German cyber authorities and is prepared to offer lessons learned and technical presentations, including TUTELAGE, to aid in the development of German SIGINT support to CND.

4. (TS//SI//NF) Demonstrate the value of NSA-BND collaboration on [REDACTED] and Special Source access programs.

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, DEU) **BND Collaboration with Special Source Operations (SSO): WHARPDRIVE (EMERALD):** Thank the BND for their assistance with the trilateral program, acknowledging recent delays due to funding constraints by both partners. Reassure that the BND is the program lead with NSA playing a technical support role. *For background only, WHARPDRIVE has been identified for possible termination due to fiscal constraints, but the partners have not been informed.*

5. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, DEU) **Middle East & Africa:** Thank the BND for providing West African [REDACTED] language assistance used by high-level [REDACTED] officials; State that NSA is looking forward to learning more about the BND's capabilities in [REDACTED]

6. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, DEU) **AFSC:** Commend the Germans for their support and leadership in RC-North Multinational SIGINT Cell and their efforts to contribute to Division -of-Effort Reporting on governance targets. Explain that German support in [REDACTED] will be critical in maintaining necessary threat warning and force protection in 2013/14 as MES becomes a logistical hub and potential egress route into [REDACTED] *Regarding the post-2014 disposition of U.S. forces, state that the coalition partners will discuss this topic at the early May 2013 AFSC conference in Denmark.*

7. (S//SI//REL TO USA, DEU) **Counter-IED:** Thank the BND for supporting the Counter-IED mission in RC-North and for engaging the CIED SIGINT Seniors Europe (SSEUR) venues. NSA looks forward to continued cooperation in the post [REDACTED] 2014 environment on a global basis.

8. (S//REL TO USA, DEU) **NSA Manning at Bad Aibling Post-Summer 2013:** At the DDIR's request in January 2013, SID re-evaluated the technical presence at SUSLAG. Convey that NSA has difficult choices to make in this challenging fiscal climate and will continue to keep the BND's request for consideration. Reference the availability of VTC, the European Technical Center (ETC), and the CHATTERII communications tool to provide assistance.

(U) VISIT FORMAT:

- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, DEU) The BND will provide briefings on [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as well as on Germany's posture on CND.
- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, DEU) NSA Participants: SID DIR, D/DIRFA, ADD/Acquisition; ADD/CT; GCM South Asia; GCM International Crime & Narcotics;

GCM Middle East & Africa; D/GCM CT; D/GCM International Security Issues; Chief SIGDEV; D/CH NTOC

(U) PREVIOUS VISITS AND RESPECTIVE TOPICS: Hr. B [REDACTED] first visited NSA in December 2011 for familiarization with NSA's mission and discussions with SID leadership.

(TS//SI//NF) POTENTIAL LANDMINES:

- **(TS//SI//NF) SKYPE:** The Germans may bring up the subject of SKYPE. NSA's response has been that it has had some success working SKYPE via tailored access at the end point by gaining access to one or more of the computers involved in the session. When Hr. Klaus-Fritsche (State Secretary, Germany Ministry of Interior) sought NSA's assistance with intercepting SKYPE transmissions during a 10 January 2012 meeting with DIRNSA, DIRNSA suggested the DNI Representative Berlin take the lead in arranging an exchange to include CIA, FBI and NSA. Should the partner raise this issue again, recommend that NSA once again redirects them to FBI and CIA.

(U) OTHER INFORMATION:

- (S//NF) BIOs: E [REDACTED] and K [REDACTED]
- (TS//SI//NF) Talking Point Papers: S2A, S2E, S2G, S2I, S3, and NTOC

(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED] CDO Germany, [REDACTED]