

(U) Topic: Global Collaboration Environment (GCE)

(U//FOUO) Director's Talking Points:

- (S//REL TO USA, GBR) Thank GCHQ for giving full support to GCE, and for partnering with NSA to engage in synchronized messaging to other organizations.
- (S//REL TO USA, GBR) Encourage GCHQ to host the permanent facility for the joint SSEUR collaboration center, in order to maximize the benefit for the Five Eyes partnership.
- (S//REL TO USA, GBR) Offer NSA's assistance in finding good solutions for incorporating GCE access into GCHQ's analytic workflow. Encourage GCHQ to engage with NSA's TD on this subject.

(U) Background:

(S//SI//REL TO USA, GBR) On 02 April 2013, SID Foreign Partner Strategist (FPS) [REDACTED] held a discussion with [REDACTED] (Head of Bilateral and Multilateral Relations, GCHQ International Relations) to discuss the future of GCE in a post-Afghanistan era. The two discussed the benefits of NSA and GCHQ having a united front in its dealings with the other foreign partners on this issue. They also discussed the possibility of the UK hosting a permanent facility where analysts from partner nations could be co-located, along with ways to better integrate GCE into each partner's analytic workflow.

(U) Conversation Summary:

- (S//REL TO USA, GBR) GCHQ is "all-in" on the GCE concept, both virtually and supporting some type of permanent facility where analysts could be co-located. GCHQ wants to be in sync with NSA in messaging the concept in Partner meetings. In [REDACTED] view, the SIGINT Seniors Europe (SSEUR) Principals are mostly "all-in" on GCE, but that message needs to be driven down to working levels in SSEUR nations where there is persistent pushback.
- (S//REL TO USA, GBR) [REDACTED] wants GCHQ's technical personnel to engage with TD more vigorously so GCHQ can find good solutions for incorporating GCE access into their analytic workflow. He indicated GCHQ has some catching up to do regarding NSA's approach to how GCE will be integrated into NSA's analytic workflow. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] that GCHQ should reach out to [REDACTED] (Chief, T32 – Enterprise Connectivity & Specialized IT Services) to discuss integration options.
- (S//REL TO USA, GBR) [REDACTED] is going to explore whether the UK could host a permanent facility for a joint SSEUR collaboration center. Messrs. [REDACTED] (SID Foreign Partner Strategist) and [REDACTED] thought a UK-hosted facility would be optimal in terms of having the most flexibility in tuning the operation to benefit the Five Eyes. There was

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discussion concerning the French hosting a permanent site, especially in terms of trying to incorporate a French-based collaboration infrastructure vs. GCE.

- (S//REL TO USA, GBR) Some European nations may be leery about hosting a facility in their nation partly based upon uncertainty on what missions the center will support, and associated concerns for European human rights laws.
- (S//REL TO USA, GBR) The discussions also included a Five-Eyes messaging approach, with the intent of encouraging coalition transition from the dated and functionally limited (but sovereign) SIGDASYS infrastructure to the advanced, US-hosted, COI-based GCE infrastructure. NSA's messaging is currently focused on presenting GCE as an additive capability providing a joint operational model based upon the Afghan SIGINT Coalition (AFSC) – which SIGDASYS doesn't provide. NSA has also started a messaging campaign with some trusted Third Party partners to encourage SSEUR mission groups to explore the GCE option once the SSEUR COI becomes fully operational and open to all members. NSA is working with Norway (who hosts SISECT) to do some initial testing of the SSEUR COI and plan to open it to all SSEUR members in the coming weeks.
- (S//REL TO USA, GBR) There will likely be GCE-related discussions during GREY GHOST (SSEUR Conference in June 2013), along with a SIGINT Seniors Executive Board (SSEB) task force update on a recommendation for a temporary or permanent solution for future Support to Military Operations (SMO) or crisis support operations. Also expected is an SSEUR COI update and case studies/lessons learned from recent or ongoing crisis support missions (e.g., In-Amenas, Syria, Mali, Somali Piracy).

(U) **Potential Landmine:** None.

(U) **Date of Material:** 10 April 2013

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